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NOTE
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL
BUSINESS INFORMATION UNDER THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT:
TOWARD A MORE OBJECTIVE
STANDARD
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who
mean to be their own governors, must arm themselves with the
power knowledge gives. A popular government without popular
information or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a
farce or a tragedy or perhaps both.1
I
INTRODUCTION
It is a fundamental premise of American democracy that the
quality of government is intimately related to the political aware-
ness and sophistication of the citizenry. 2 The Freedom of Informa-
tion Act3 was enacted in 1966 in the hope of increasing such
awareness and sophistication by providing the public with more
complete access to the records of federal agencies. 4 To carry out
that purpose, the Act directed all federal agencies upon request to
make available to "any person ' 5 any "identifiable" agency records.
Emphasizing its policy of furthering broad public disclosure, the
Act conferred de novo jurisdiction upon federal district courts to
review an agency's decision to withhold its records from disclosure
and placed the burden of proof in such an action upon the
government.7 At the same time, the Act attempted to accommodate
I James Madison, as Chairman of the committee drafting the first amendment, quoted in
S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1965) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.].
2 Indeed, the first amendment derived its guarantee of free expression from the
assumption by the framers of the Constitution that only a well-informed electorate could
effectively oversee the machinery of government. See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A
Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191: Note, The
Constitutionality of Financial Disclosure Laws, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 345 n.3 (1973).
3 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
4 Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824
(1970).
5 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (Supp. I1, 1972).
6 Id.
On complaint, the district court of the United States in the district in which the
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legitimate needs for governmental and individual privacy by de-
lineating nine specific instances in which information in agencies'
hands would be exempted from disclosure.8 One such exemption
covers "trade secrets and commercial or financial information
obtained from a person and privileged or confidential."9 The
purpose of this Note is to examine that exemption with a critical
eye suggesting a possible judicial resolution of its inherent am-
biguities in a manner consistent with the public's interest in dis-
closure and the individual's right of privacy.
THE GENERAL SCHEME OF THE ACT
The specific disclosure requirements of the Freedom of In-
formation Act were inspired by congressional dissatisfaction with
the rather vague disclosure provisions of the old Administrative
Procedure Act.' 0 The latter had allowed agencies to withhold
information on the grounds of "public interest," "good cause
found," or the lack of a party "properly and directly concerned"
complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency
records are situated, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency
records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld
from the complainant. In such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo
and the burden is on the agency to sustain its actions. In the event of noncom-
pliance with the order of the court, the district court may punish for contempt the
responsible employee ....
Id.
8 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970) exempts from the disclosure requirements of the Act any
matters that are
(1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
the national defense or foreign policy;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a dearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the
extent available by law to a party other than an agency;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports
prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the
regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concern-
ing wells.
Id.
9 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (4) (1970).
10 See Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824
(1970).
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with the revelation of the sought-after information." Such broad,
discretionary standards too frequently supplied government agen-
des with an easy rationale for withholding information to which
the public was arguably entitled. 12
It was the design of the Freedom of Information Act to
promote greater public access to government information. To
fulfill that design the vaguely-defined loopholes of the old Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act were replaced by a general disclosure
requirement subject to nine limited exemptions.' 3 Under the Act's
new disclosure requirements a citizen could no longer be denied
access to government information by an agency's mere assertion
that the "public interest" or "good cause" demanded that such
information remain confidential. Furthermore, "any.person"-not
only one "properly and directly concerned" with the information in
question-could now demand the disclosure of government re-
cords.
Both legislative history and the wording of the statute itself
emphasize that the nine exceptions to full disclosure were designed
to be specifically and narrowly construed. The Senate Report on
the Freedom of Information Act emphasizes that the intent of the
law is to "establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure
unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory
language."'4 The Act itself reinforces this "strict constructionist"
view in section (c), where the withholding of information from the
public is said to be unauthorized "except as specifically stated" in the
Act.' 5 Such statutory language suggests that only information
which falls squarely within the rather limited exemptions found in
section (b) should be considered exempt from the Act's general
requirement of full public disclosure.' 6 By thus replacing the
Administrative Procedure Act's vague tests with a general disclos-
ure requirement limited only by specific exceptions, the Freedom
of Information Act was intended to provide a more objective and
Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238.
12 See 1971 U. ILL. L. FORUM 329, 335 (1971).
13 See note 8 supra; Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 824 (1970); American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
S. REP. 3.
14 S. REP. 3.
15 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970) (emphasis added).
16 One commentator has stressed the.significance of the "specificity" requirement of
subsection (c): "The pull of the word 'specifically' is toward emphasis on statutory language
and away from all else-away from implied meanings, away from reliance on legislative
history, away from needed judicial legislation." Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary
Analysis, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 761, 783 (1967) [hereinafter. cited as Davis].
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predictable resolution of the tension between disclosure and
confidentiality that is inherent in government information policies.
III
THE SCOPE OF EXEMPTION (4)
Subsection (b) (4) of the Freedom of Information Act exempts
from the statute's disclosure requirements "trade secrets and com-
mercial or financial information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential."1 7 Thus, by the terms of the statute, to
qualify for the exemption, the agency information in question must
(1) have been obtained from some "person" outside of the
government I8 and (2) have originally consisted of trade secrets, or
commercial or financial information that is either privileged or
"confidential."1 9 It is relatively easy to determine whether the
information given by a person to the government constitutes a
"trade secret" or is "privileged" within the sweep of subsection (b)
(4).20 But when a government agency argues that information
17 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970).
18 See Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 582 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Consumers' Union v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp. 796, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (1971). Grumman Aircraft emphasized that although
agencies could not make information confidential by merely passing it around among
themselves, information in the hands of one agency which was deemed "confidential" would
not lose its immunity from disclosure merely because it had been put into the hands of
another agency. 425 F.2d at 582.
The Attorney General of the United States has stated that subsection (b) (4) should
apply to information coming from the public at large, from a particular person, or from
within a government agency. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON
THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 34 (June 1967)
[hereinafter cited as MEMORANDUM]. But the Attorney General's Memorandum generally reflects
the government agencies' bias toward nondisclosure. See Davis 761. The Attorney General's
broad interpretation has been rejected by the courts. See Consumers' Union and Grumman
Aircraft, supra.
19 Some courts and commentators asserted during the first few years of the Act's
operation that this last category of exempted information should include as well noncom-
mercial or nonfinancial information that is privileged or confidential. See, e.g., Barceloneta
Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D. Puerto Rico 1967) (investigatory file on unfair
labor practices held within sweep of (b) (4)); MEMORANDUM 34; Note, Freedom of Information,
56 Geo. L. J. 18, 35 (1967). However, at present the consensus of judicial opinion is that
exemption (4) applies only to (I) trade secrets or (2) information which is (a) commercial or
financial, and (b) privileged or confidential. See Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 351 F. Supp. 404, 406 (D.D.C.
1972); Davis 787; Steward & Ward, F.T.C. Discovery: Depositions, The Freedom of Information Act
and Confidential Informants, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 248, 254 (1967).
20 A "trade secret" bas been defined in fairly precise judicial terms as "an unpatented,
secret, commercially valuable plan, appliance, formula, or process, which is used for the
making, preparing, compounding, treating, or processing of articles or materials which are
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which it has obtained should be deemed "confidential," the analysis
becomes more delicate. "Confidentiality" is a broad term, subject to
varying interpretations.2 1 Therefore, in construing that term in the
context of exemption (4), it is important that the courts restrict its
meaning in a manner consistent with the broad disclosure purposes
of the Freedom of Information Act as a whole.22
IV
THE JUDICIAL SEARCH FOR A DEFINITION
OF "CONFIDENTIALITY"
As has been previously noted, the overriding purpose of the
Freedom of Information Act was to substitute for existing vague
disclosure provisions, a general disclosure requirement for all
government records, subject only to certain limited exceptions.2 3 In
light of both legislative intent 24 and statutory language, 25 it is clear
that the nine exceptions to the Act's mandate of general disclosure
should be construed as narrowly as is consistent with their
purpose.2 6 The purpose of exemption (4) is to protect from dis-
trade commodities." United States ex rel. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States
Tariff Comm., 6 F.2d 491, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1925), rev'd on other grounds, 274 U.S. 106 (1927).
See generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b at 5 (1939). Whether particular
information constitutes a "trade secret" within the meaning of subsection (b) (4), therefore,
should not be a difficult judicial determination. For an example of a court's determination
that certain information constituted "trade secrets" within the meaning of exemption (4)
because it involved "explanations of the intricacies of production or testing" see Fisher v.
Renegotiation Bd., 355 F. Supp. 1171, 1176 (D.D.C. 1973). It should be no less difficult for
the courts to determine whether certain commercial or financial information is "privileged"
so as to be subject to the (b) (4) exemption. The House and Senate reports on the Freedom
of Information Act make it clear that information subject to such traditional evidentiary
privileges as that of lawyer-client were intended to be covered by that subsection. See S. REP.
9; H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.].
21 " 'Privileged' is the clearer and narrower of the two [terms] being generally used to
cover judicially recognized evidentiary privileges. . . . 'Confidentiality,' not being a term of
art, presents almost the other extreme." Note, Freedom ofInformation, 56 GEo. L J. 18, 35-36
(1967).
22 For a summary of the broad disclosure policies that underlie the Act see notes 10-13
and accompanying text supra.
2. See notes 13-16 and accompanying text supra.
24 See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
2' See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970); note 13 and accompanying text supra.
26 The touchstone of any proceedings under the Act must be the clear legislative
intent to assure public access to all governmental records whose disclosure would
not significantly harm specific governmental interests. The policy of the Act
requires that the disclosure requirement be construed broadly, the exemptions
narrowly.
Soude v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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closure certain types of private commercial information which, if
revealed, might subject an individual to financial or personal
embarrassment.17 By offering protection to such information it was
hoped that the exemption would "encourage individuals to provide
[these] ... kinds of confidential information to the Government. '28
Thus, the Congressional purposes underlying. both the general
disclosure provisions of the Act and this protective exemption can
only be carried out, it is suggested, by a narrow interpretation of
the exemption. 9
Unfortunately, many courts have adopted a subjective
definition of confidentiality which potentially could allow broader
immunity of government materials from disclosure than is war-
ranted by the purpose of exemption (4). This subjective definition,
adopted by a majority of courts, was at first characterized by
emphasis upon the expressed intent of the communicant-i.e., the
person initially providing the government with the information.
If he had requested that his information not be disclosed, the court
would consider this conclusive on the question of confidentiality. 30
A later variation of this test focused, perhaps somewhat more
objectively, upon certain presumptions of what the communicant's
intent concerning the confidentiality of his information ought to
have been.31 Both the principal test and its variation, however, are
essentially subjective and carry a similar potential for allowing
exemption (4) to overreach its boundaries and swallow some of the
important disclosure policies of the Freedom of Information Act.
A. The Initial Subjective Definition of Confidentiality
Under the initial judicial approach to exemption (4), any
commercial or financial information which might conceivably have
been given to the government by an individual asking that the
information not be disclosed to the public was deemed
"confidential. ' 32 This broad definition of confidentiality apparently
27 See S. REP. 9; H.R. REP. 10. In the words of one court, the purpose of exemption (4)
is "to prevent the unwarranted invasions of personal privacy which might be caused by the
Government's indiscriminate release of confidential information." Grumman Aircraft Eng'r
Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
28 Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
29 "This exemption is intended to encourage individuals to provide certain kinds of
confidential information to the Government, and it must be read narrowly in accordance
with that purpose." Id.
30 See notes 32-45 and accompanying text infra.
31 See notes 46-54 and accompanying text infra.
32 See Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D. Puerto Rico 1967);
Davis 787-92.
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received its impetus from the following language of the House
Report on the Freedom of Information Act:
The exemption would include business sales statistics, inven-
tories, customer lists, scientific or manufacturing processes or
developments, and negotiation positions or requirements in the
case of labor-management mediations.... It would also include
information which is given to an agency in confidence, since a citizen
must be able to confide in his Government. Moreover, where the Govern-
ment has obligated itself in good faith not to disclose documents or
information which it receives, it should be able to honor such
obligations.33
In the first years of the Act's operation a few courts and commen-
tators seized upon this language of the House Report to justify
exempting from disclosure any material given to the government
with the understanding that it would be kept confidential. 34 The
rationale for such a construction of exemption (4) was found not
only in the abstract need of the government to honor its obligations
but also in a more practical need to encourage individuals to reveal
personal financial information to federal agencies. Such, for exam-
ple, was the argument of the court in Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v.
Compton,35 where statements of persons "given in confidence" 36 to
agents of the National Labor Relations Board investigating unfair
labor practices were exempted from disclosure.37 Also, in The
Tobacco Institute v. FTC,38a demand for the disclosure of the names
33 H.R. REP. 10 (emphasis added).
34 See, e.g., Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591, 594 (D. Puerto Rico
1967). In Benson v. General Services Admin., 289 F. Supp. 590 (W.D. Wash. 1968),
aff'd, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969), an appraisal report concerning certain property
involved in a tax dispute was deemed not subject to exemption (4). The court then added as
dictum: "[Tihe exemption is meant to protect information that a private individual wishes to
keep confidential for his own purposes, but reveals to the government under the express.or
implied promise by the government that the information will be kept confidential." 289 F.
Supp. at 594. In affirming the decision a year later, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit approved this dictum. 415 F.2d at 881.
15 271 F. Supp. 591 (D. Puerto Rico 1967).
36 Id. at 594.
"I After emphasizing that the persons from whom the information had been obtained
had asked the governmment investigators that it be kept confidential, the court said:
The reasons urged by the Plaintiffs to support their request for the production
of these documents prior to the Board hearing are outweighed by the reasons
urged by the Defendant for withholding the documents at this time. It cannot
be denied that if disdosure... is allowed, persons interviewed by Board agents in
future investigations will not be as cooperative as they are now if they know that the
information they give to the Board agents would be subject to public disdosure....
The hampering effect which this would have upon the Board's investigations is
obvious.
Id.
31 Civ. No. 3035-67 (D.D.C., Apr. 11, 1968).
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and addresses of persons who had received questionnaires con-
cerning the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act was
met by an opinion from the bench exempting from disclosure any
questionnaires returned with the proviso that they not be made
public.39
Courts construing exemption (4) to cover any information
whose communication to the government was accompanied by an
assertion of confidentiality reached a result both insufficiently
supported by legislative history40 and contrary to the plain wording
and purpose of the Freedom of Information Act.41 Under this
initial construction of exemption (4) an agency's mere assertion of
its promise of confidentiality was considered sufficient to justify
withholding the information in question from the public. 42 This
broad construction gave government agencies, rather than the
courts, discretion to decide what information should be exempted
from disclosure under the Act.43  As a result of using the
communicant's subjective intent as the benchmark of "con-
fidentiality," the courts expanded the exemption's reach to an
extent beyond that intended by Congress. 44 As a consequence, the
broad disclosure policy of the Act was circumvented. 45
39 This case is interesting not only for its broad construction of confidentiality but also
for its possible interpretation of exemption (4) as applying to noncommercial or nonfinancial
information. Sucb an interpretation has now been almost universally discredited. See note 19
and accompanying text supra.
40 Although the House Report on the Freedom of Information Act lends support to
this broad construction of exemption (4), the Report is considered misleading in light of the
statutory language. See Davis 763.
41 The broad purpose of the Act is to establish a general requirement for the disclosure
of all government records that do not fall within certain limited exempt categories. See note
8 supra. The "specificity" requirement for exemption expressed in section (c) reinforces this
purpose. See notes 14-16 and accompanying text supra.
42 As one commentator viewed the broad construction of exemption (4) initially
adopted by some courts,
[T]he agency, within the indeterminate limits of good faith, can withhold anything
it desires by simply alleging a promise of or reason for confidentiality. As such, this
is one of the greatest loopholes in the bill.... [Iindiscriminate withholding of all
commercial and financial information would not only frustrate the reason for the
Act but would clothe some of the largest and most important agencies in almost
total secrecy.
Note, Freedom of Information, 56 GEo. L.J. 18, 37 (1967).
43 One of the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act was to allow the courts,
rather than the agencies, to exercise such discretion. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
44 The purposes of exemption (4) are to protect from disclosure certain types of private
commercial or financial information whose revelation might prove harmful to the individual
from whom it was obtained, thereby encouraging citizens to voluntarily supply such
information to the federal government. See notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra. These
purposes can be realized by a more objective and limited definition of "confidential
information" which places greater emphasis upon the general public interest in disclosure.
See notes 102-05 and accompanying text infra.
4 The 1'reedon of Information Act was designed to promote greater disclosure of
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B. Variations on the Theme
Judicial recognition of the inadequacy of the initial construc-
tion of exemption (4) was not long in coming. As the courts became
more experienced in balancing the interests of confidentiality and
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, they became
-aware of the need to adopt a more objective interpretation of the
exemption. 46 This awareness sparked the adoption by most courts
of a new test of confidentiality which relied less upon the expressed
intent of the communicant. Confidential information, under this
"new" test, was deemed to include any matters which a communi-
cant, in the ordinary course of events, would not be expected to
make public.4 7 As did the earlier construction of the exemption,
this new approach to subsection (b) (4) found support. in legislative
history-this time in the Senate Report on the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act:
This exception is necessary to protect the confidentiality of
information which is obtained by the Government through ques-
tionnaires or other inquiries, but which would customarily not be
released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained. This
would include business sales statistics, inventories, customer lists,
and manufacturing processes. 48
In equating confidential information with matters which an
individual would not normally disclose, the courts ostensibly took
an important step toward a more objective interpretation of ex-
emption (4). This new judicial approach at least focused upon the
nature of the information which the communicant had revealed to
an agency. It thus forced the courts to consider the substance of
that information before deciding whether it was of the type which
a communicant would not want to have disclosed to the public. In
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC,4 9 for example, data on costs of produc-
tion, amounts of sales of certain products, profits made in particu-
lar markets, and the exact amounts of bids submitted to a corpora-
tion on a closed basis were all exempted from disclosure. In
National Parks & Conservation Association v. Morton,5 ° exemption (4)
was held to cover similar business information including statistics
government information by transferring from federal agencies to the federal judiciary the
discretion to determine, in borderline cases, what information ought to be revealed to, or
concealed from, the public. See S. REP. 5.
46 Compare Benson v. General Services Admin., 289 F. Supp. 590 (W.D. Wash. 1968)
with General Services Admin. v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969) (same case on appeal).
47 See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
48 S. REP'. 9 (emphasis added).
49 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
50 351 F. Supp. 404 (D.D.C. 1972).
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on sales, inventory, and salary and security liabilities. Although
both decisions could have been justified on the ground that such
statistics could be used by competitors to a businessman's detri-
ment, each court held that the information should have been
exempted from disclosure because it "would customarily not be
released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained."51
Such vague rationales leave open the question of whether the
information was being saved by the courts from disclosure merely
because of a communicant's subjective wish that it remain
confidential or on the broader basis that the revelation of the
information would bring to the communicant objective business
harm.
This "new" test of confidentiality possesses defects similar to
those which encumbered the original judicial construction of ex-
emption (4), for it carries with it the same potential for defining
"confidential information" in terms of a communicant's subjective
intent.52 Under this standard matters which arguably ought to be
revealed to the public may be too easily shielded from revelation. It
is difficult to imagine borderline questions of disclosure where a
court would find a communicant more likely than not to reveal his
private business information to the public.53 By so allowing a
communicant's own perception-or presumed perception-of the
confidential nature of his information to be determinative of the
government's disdosure policy toward that information, the courts
are not only abdicating their responsibility to lay down objective
guidelines for a federal information policy; they are also allowing
exemption (4) to subvert the broad purpose of the Freedom of
Information Act to promote full disclosure of all appropriate
government information. 54
51 351 F. Supp. at 406; 450 F.2d at 709.
52 While this [new] standard is more objective than a blanket exemption for
anything labelled "confidential" by the Board, the test nevertheless does require
that the judge decide whether the [communicant] would reveal the information to
the public. The answer to that subjective inquiry may depend, inter alia, upon
whether the [communicant] is... a corporation, properietorship, or partnership.
Alternatively, a court could apply some variation of the "reasonable man"
standard-that is, would a reasonable person or enterprise reveal this information
to the public.
Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act, 1973 DuKE L.J. 178, 195 n. 123.
53 It can quite naturally be assumed that when in doubt about the adverse effect which
the revelation of financial information will have upon their business, most communicants
would not customarily reveal such information to the public. It would be easy for courts or
government agencies biased against a liberal disclosure policy to defeat it by employing such
a standard. For a description of how the courts have done so see notes 32-52 and
accompanying text supra. For a description of how some agencies have done so see notes
57-59 and accompanying text infra.
54 See notes 4-16 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 60:109
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
Missing from this second judicial construction of "con-
fidentiality" is a consideration of the reasonableness of a source's
desire to withhold information from the public. There may be
good reasons for compelling the revelation of certain manufactur-
ing or sales statistics if their disclosure would not substantially
prejudice a businessman's competitive position. 55 Any court, how-
ever, which confined itself to the determination of whether a
communicant would customarily reveal such matters to the public
might completely miss this consideration and mechanically exempt
such information from disclosure.
The dangers of a simplistic and subjective construction of
exemption (4) are emphasized by the actual disclosure practices of
some government agencies. The Attorney General's Memorandum
on the Freedom of Information Act, for example, advises federal
agencies that the exemption covers any material not likely to be
disclosed by a communicant. The agencies, the Memorandum
continues, may therefore "find it appropriate to consult with the
person who provided the information before deciding whether the
exemption applies. '5 6 Such a procedure provides government
agencies with obvious encouragement to circumvent the broad
disclosure policies of the Act by merely alleging their sources'
desires for confidentiality. Further, it may be assumed that agen-
cies are not shy about implying their "constituents'" desires for
confidentiality. 57 If permitted to use such implied desires as a
rationale in support of nondisclosure, government agencies would,
in effect, be reverting to the original and most subjective judicial
construction of exemption (4)-a construction which allowed the
55 The revelation of sales, inventory, market, and customer statistics may not always
prejudice a businessman in a significant way. Such information may already be available to
his competitors as a result of their own investigations or because such information is general
knowledge within the industry. Also, such statistical information may not always be of the
kind which can be effectively utilized by a businessman's competitors. Thus, the degree to
which a businessman will actually be prejudiced by the revelation of private sales and market
information should be open to judicial examination before any determination is made that
such matters should be exempted from disclosure under subsection (b) (4). This type of
examination is avoided when the courts assume that certain types of business statistics should
be exempted from disclosure merely because communicants would not customarily wish to
reveal such information to their competitors.
56 MEMORANDUM 34.
57 [T]he agencies are willing to accept or even imply a desire for confidentiality
without considering the countervailing interest which the public has in disclosure.
When documents have been made available to an agency, but are not of public
knowledge, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which the communicant would
want the documents made public.
Note, The 1966 Freedom of Information Act--Early Judicial Interpretations, 44 WASH. L
REv. 641, 682 (1969).
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withholding of any information allegedly given to the government
with the understanding that it be kept confidential. 58
In recently promulgated regulations, various government
agencies have set forth disclosure policies which use this broad
definition of confidentiality to justify withholding from the public
information to which it is arguably entitled. The Department of the
Air Force, for example, exempts from disclosure any information
it has received under the express or implied understanding that it
will remain confidential. 59 The Commission on Civil Rights ex-
empts from public revelation not only any data for which a com-
municant has requested confidential status but also any informa-
tion which may support allegations of wrongdoing "by certain
persons or entities. °6 0 That such a broad discretion to withhold
information is presently being exercised by government agencies is
but one indication of the dangers of the subjective approach to
exemption (4) now followed by a majority of courts.6'
C. Judicial Inclination Toward a New Definition of Confidentiality
Aware of the dangers of a completely subjective construc-
tion of exemption (4), some courts have applied a "reasonable
man" standard to the exemption. 2 Under this test, the courts
consider whetber a "reasonable man," rather than the particular
communicant whose information is being sought, would reveal the
material in question to the public. It is presumed that a "reasonable
man" would only withhold that commercial or financial informa-
tion which would significantly prejudice his business interests.
Thus, in Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC,6 3 the Court of Appeals for
5' See notes 32-39 and accompanying text supra.
59 32 C.F.R. § 806.5(d) (1973).
60 45 C.F.R. § 704.1 (f) (2) (1973). Information is deemed to be confidential under these
regulations when it is "reasonable to conclude that the communicant would not wish... the
substance of the communication disclosed to the public." Id. And such a conclusion is
deemed to be reasonable merely when there is involved "a communication alleging, or
supporting. an allegation of, the commission of wrongs by certain persons or entities." Id.
The Regulations of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare exhibit somewhat
more refinement. They recognize an objective test of confidentiality in addition to the
subjective approach traditionally followed by the courts. Subjectively, the regulations exempt
from disclosure any information obtained by the Department "in reliance upon a provision
for confidentiality authorized by applicable statute." 45 C.F.R. § 5.71 (c) (1973). But the
regulations also include, as a more objective test of confidentiality, a determination of "the
type and degree of risk of financial injury to be expected if disclosure occurs." 45 C.F.R. §
5.71 (b) (3) (1973).
61 See, eg., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971); National Parks &
Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 351 F. Supp. 404 (D.D.C. 1972); Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v.
Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D. Puerto Rico 1967).
62 See cases cited in notes 63-68 infra.
63 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
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the District of Columbia was dissatisfied with a district court de-
termination that FTC records concerning the characteristics of
certain pain relieving drugs should be exempted from disclosure
merely because those records contained information that particular
drug manufacturers "[did] not wish to have disclosed to their
competitors. ' 64 In remanding for a more detailed explanation of
why exemption (4) should be applied to the FTC records, the
Court of Appeals emphasized the district court's responsibility to
determine the reasonableness, in light of all surrounding circum-
stances, of the assertion of confidentiality. 65 In M. A. Schapiro & Co.
v. SEC,66 a district court concluded that various communicants'
interests in the confidentiality of an SEC staff study of national
security exchanges were not strong enough to bring the study
within exemption (4), and added:
Regardless of whether the information was submitted on the
express or implied condition that it be kept confidential, a Court
should determine, on an objective basis, that this is not the type of
information one would reveal to its public.67
Finally, in Fisher v. Renegotiation Board, 68 a district court applied the
"reasonable man" standard in concluding that certain production,
pricing, and sales statistics should be deemed "confidential" under
exemption (4). Not content to hold simply that the communicant
would not have revealed such information to the public, the court
engaged in a detailed analysis of the reasonableness of the
communicant's claim of confidentiality in light of the competitive
business disadvantages he might suffer if the information in ques-
tion were ever disclosed.69
Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 284 F. Supp. 745, 747 (1968).
65 [Exemption (4)] serves the important function of protecting the privacy and the
competitive position of the citizen who offers information to assist government
policy makers. Nevertheless, the statutory scheme does not permit a bare claim of
confidentiality to immunize agency files from scrutiny. The District Court in the
first instance has the responsibility of determing the validity and extent of the claim,
and insuring that the exemption is strictly construed in light of the legislative in-
tent. . . .These judgments are possible only after careful consideration of the
particular documents in question, and it is for this detailed analysis that we remand.
424 F.2d at 938-39.
66 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972).
67 339 F. Supp. at 471 (emphasis added).
8 355 F. Supp. 1171 (D.D.C. 1973).
9 The forms contain financial information from a person (the corporation) which
the contractor would not reveal to the public and which is, therefore, confidential.
The contractor's claim of confidentiality is reasonable because knowledge of pro-
duction, overhead and operating costs, levels of profit, sales and pricing data, as
well as other facts included in the Forms would greatly assist those companies in
competition with the contractor. In addition, defense contractors would be put at a
competitive disadvantage in purely commercial markets where they compete with
contractors not required to disclose. Furthermore, public availability of the Stan-
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The Fisher court's objective analysis is a sound approach to
exemption (4) cases and may anticipate the future direction of
judicial thinking in this area. A court concerned with the reasona-
bleness of an assertion of confidentiality should consider the actual
consequences of disclosure upon a communicant, rather than
merely his subjective intent to keep certain information secret.
Information then would be exempted from disclosure not merely
because a communicant fears its revelation or because it includes
private business statistics,'7 0 but because its revelation would carry
consequences so harmful to the communicant that they would
outweigh the potential benefits of full disclosure.' Only such an
objective definition of confidentiality can guarantee that the dis-
closure requirements of the Act will not be swallowed up by one of
its exceptions.
D. The Need for a New Approach
If the policies of the Freedom of Information Act are to be
adequately fulfilled, a majority of courts must recoguize the need
for an objective approach to exemption (4). The many courts still
adhering to the original subjective construction of exemption (4),72
or to its later variation,' 3 must switch the focus of their considera-
dard Forms of Contractor's Report may reduce the number of contractors willing to
compete for defense contracts, especially those primarily or even partially in
commercial markets; these contractors would have to choose between not compet-
ing for a contract covered by the Renegotiation Act and filing forms publicly
revealing confidential business information.
355 F. Supp. at 1175.
70 Both the Senate and House Reports on the Freedom of Information Act mention
that profit, sales, and marketing statistics are covered by exemption (4) (see notes 33 & 48
and accompanying text supra), and the courts have almost universally viewed such informa-
tion as justifying a per se application of the exemption. See notes 49-51 and accompanying
text supra.
71 Not all of the refinements of the "reasonable man" approach to exemption (4) are
immediately apparent. As an outgrowth of that approach, several courts, after initially
determining that information was "independently confidential" by reason of the business
harm which its revelation would bring to a communicant, have nevertheless ordered
disclosure. To avoid the "breach of confidentiality" which full disclosure might have
entailed, the courts have directed that the information be made public without any "identify-
ing details" that would indicate which communicant's business statistics were being disclosed.
See, e.g., Grumman Aircraft Engr Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(striking "identifying details" connecting contractors to cost and profit data solves
confidentiality problem). But see Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 355 F. Supp. 1171 (D.D.C.
1973) (striking "identifying details" would not solve confidentiality problem).
This practice of striking identifying details supplements the "reasonable man" approach
by allowing disclosure of information which otherwise would be withheld from public
scrutiny because of potential prejudice to a communicant.
72 See notes 32-45 and accompanying text supra.
73 See notes 46-54 and accompanying text supra.
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tion from the communicant's intent to the more objective question
of what harmful business consequences may befall a communicant
as a result of disclosure. Indeed, even those courts which have
recognized the need for greater objectivity through their adoption
of the "reasonable man" approach to exemption (4)74 must be
more explicit about their view of confidentiality in order to make it
clear that only information which could reasonably be expected to
substantially harm a communicant's business interests should be
covered by the exemption.
It may be argued that such a revision of judicial theory is not
necessary because even under the current subjective tests of
confidentiality the courts have generally exempted from disclosure
only those special types of private statistics whose revelation would
cause substantial business harm to the communicant.7 5 However, it
is by no means apparent from the cases using the older tests that
other less prejudicial types of information were not also shielded
by the courts from disclosure.7 6 Even had the courts confined
themselves to shielding these special types of business statistics
from scrutiny, a revision in judicial theory would be appropriate,
for keeping a businessman's sales, profit, cost, and production data
from the public may not always accord with the policies of the
Freedom of Information Act.7 7
Moreover, regardless of the resnlts in prior cases arising under
exemption (4), serious potential for abuse does exist under the
present judicial constructions of that exemption. Those construc-
tions give federal agencies too broad a license to independently
decide, in arguable cases, to what information the public is, or is
not, entitled .7  In allowing certain business data to be exempted
from disclosure merely because a communicant would not cus-
tomarily reveal it to the public, the courts have in effect created a
wider arena for government secrecy than existed under the old
disclosure provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.7 9 Under
the Administrative Procedure Act federal agencies at least had to
justify their withholding of such data by showing some "good
74 See notes 63-69 and accompanying text supra.
75 See note 70 supra.
76 See, eg., Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D. Puerto Rico 1967)
(statements given in confidence to NLRB during unfair labor practices investigation exemp-
ted from disclosure).
" There may be situations in which such data could be released to the public without a
communicant suffering appreciable harm: for example, when the data is commouly known
within the industry. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
7' See notes 57-61 and accompanying text supra.
79 Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Star. 238.
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cause" for their decision.80 Thus, the present ambiguous judicial
interpretations of exemption (4), although at times properly resolv-
ing the conflict between disclosure and confidentiality, carry with
them a potential for abuse great enough to require a significant
change in judicial construction of the statute.
V
SUGGESTIONS FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF EXEMPTION (4)
The few courts that have applied the more strict "reasonable
man" approach to exemption (4)81 have recognized that the crucial
element in any effective defirrition of "confidentiality" under the
Freedom of Information Act is the objective determination that
substantial injury in fact would flow from the disclosure of certain
types of business information.8 2 A federal agency attempting to
withhold from the public any commercial or financial information
on the grounds that it is confidential should have the burden of
proving that such information, if revealed, would substantially
prejudice specific business interests of the communicant.8 3 Placing
80 See, eg., Graber Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, 223 F. Supp. 1020 (D.D.C. 1963), where
confidential status was given to certain business data under the old Administrative Proce-
dure Act only after the court had assured itself that the plaintiff had shown "good cause" for
the continued secrecy of the data:
[A]ccurate information as to a competitor's success or failure with a particular
product, or in a particular market area may save untold dollars in research,
development, and marketing, and allow a direct benefit from the expense and
experience of the competitor. Information as to a competitor's declining sales or
financial strength, or the number of service and repair personnel in an area, is a
potent weapon in diverting customers to one's own product or service.
Id. at 1022. The court then concluded that such financial data should be exempted from
disclosure under the Administrative Procedure Act because the plaintiff had shown that its
revelation would cause "clearly defined and serious injury to his business." Id. at 1023. The
public disclosure policies of the Freedom of Information Act are supposedly broader than
under the Administrative Procedure Act. Accordingly, the hurden in proving confidentiality
should be at least as onerous under the new Act as it was under the former statute.
:' See notes 63-69 and accompanying text supra.
82 See id.
83 Exemption (4), unlike other sections of the Freedom of Information Act, balances
an individual's interest in privacy, rather than the government's interest in secrecy, against
the public's interest in disclosure. It can thus he argued that since rights of individual citizens
hang in the balance, greater weight should be accorded the privacy interests recognized by
exemption (4). It is the thesis of this Note, however, that the general disclosure policies of
the Freedom of Information Act justify placing the burden of proving confidentiality upon
the party defending a communicant's right of privacy-i.e., the relevant federal agency. The
agency's opportunity to convince a court of the adverse business consequences which may
flow from disclosure should sufficiently protect a communicant's right of privacy, especially
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the burden of proof upon the agencies is mandated by the specific
wording of the Act.84 That such a burden should include the proof
of substantial business detriment is necessitated by the policies of
the Freedom of Information Act, under which all government
information not within certain limited exceptions must be fully
disclosed to the public.85
If the disclosure policies of the Act are not to be circumscribed,
federal agencies must be denied the discretion to decide in border-
line cases what types of business information should be deemed
"confidential. ' 86 Their discretion in this regard can only be ap-
propriately limited by requiring them to show objectively that
significant harmful consequences would be likely to result from the
disclosure of certain commercial or financial information. 87 Other-
wise, the agencies will be free to continue their present expansion
of exemption (4) in a manner destructive of the disclosure policies
of the Freedom of Information Act. For a definition of
confidentiality requiring only a showing of the likelihood of some
harm allows an agency's mere allegaton of a communicant's poten-
tial business detriment to defeat any demands for disclosure.
The Freedom of Information Act was drafted to allow the
judiciary, rather than individual communicants or agency heads, to
determine federal information disclosure policies.88 The new ob-
under an objective construction of exemption (4). See notes 102-05 and accompanying text
infra.
84 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (Supp. II, 1972). See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
Moreover, the general scheme of the Freedom of Information Act not only suggests the
need for placing the burden of proving substantial harm upon federal agencies; it makes
such a requirement imperative. The provision that information may be withheld from the
public only as "specifically stated" in the Act (5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970)) was intended to
guarantee that only the narrowest exceptions would be made to the general disclosure
requirements of the Act. This specificity requirement, although denying to the courts the
power to expand the scope of the Act's nine exceptions by judicial construction (see Getman
v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1971)), was designed to encourage the courts to
"follow their accustomed habits in narrowing the ascertainable meaning of the words of an
exemption." Davis 783-84. Exemption (4) can only remain as narrow and as specific as was
contemplated by the general scheme of the Freedom of Information Act if the courts
faithfully adhere to the "substantial harm" test.
" See notes 14-16 and accompanying text supra.
86 Granting federal agencies such discretion under the present subjective construction
of exemption (4) has resulted in significant encroachments upon the disclosure policies of
the Act. See notes 57-61 and accompanying text supra.
87 Such a showing of the likelihood of harmful consequences was a prerequisite to
exempting information from disclosure even under the generally more restrictive Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. See notes 79 & 80 and accompanying text supra. No less a showing
should be required to support exemption under the supposedly more liberal Freedom of
Information Act.
88 This intent is revealed by the Act's specific provision directing federal district courts
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jective construction of exemption (4) will vest such authority in the
courts. It will be their task to draw the line between disclosure
likely to cause "permissible harm," in which case revelation of a
communicant's business information would be appropriate, and
disclosure likely to cause "substantial harm," in which case such
information should remain confidential. A complete review by the
courts of the appropriateness of exempting certain information
from disclosure will ensure the type of objectivity in federal infor-
mation policy that was contemplated by the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act.89 The question of whether certain business data ought to
be disclosed will be determined not by a communicant's or an
agency's subjective intent, but by an objective judicial decision. As
the coritours of federal information policies are made more
definite by judicial decisions consistently finding certain types of
business information to be either "confidential" or "disclosable,"
both communicants and federal agencies will have clearer
guidelines by which to plan their conduct. 90
The judiciary's task of drawing lines between "substantial" and
"permissible" harm will not be an easy one. It is the very function
of courts, however, to draw such distinctions. Routinely, courts
resolve questions of law that pose equally delicate problems of what
priorities should be given to competing rights. 91 The courts that
grapple with such problems daily should be able to resolve the
tension inherent in exemption (4) in an objective, fair, and predict-
able manner.
It is not difficult to imagine the form which such a judicial
resolution might take. Any data which tends to reveal a company's
distinctive, hitherto unpublicized manufacturing processes or
methods of operation should be deemed "confidential" by the
courts. The pairing of "trade secrets" with "commercial or financial
information . . .[which is] confidential" within exemption (4) was
not coincidental. Through this correspondence the Congress
to determine "de novo" any disputed questions of disclosure by federal agencies. 5 U.S.C. §
552(a) (3) (Supp. II, 1972).
89 "Oin balance it seems that the courts should make the ultimate decision, since they
can make a relatively objective determination ...." 80 HARV. L. REv. 909, 914 (1967).
90 The Senate Report on the Freedom of Information Act emphasized the importance
of providing agency personnel with "definitive guidelines in setting information policies." S.
REP. 3.
91 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (balancing right of free press
against society's right to pursue and convict criminals); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968) (balancing right of free speech against need for efficient government operation);
Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (balancing teachers' associational rights against
state's right to investigate integrity of its public servants).
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hoped to save from disclosure not only that business data which
met the technical definition of trade secrets, but all commercial
information whose revelation would give competitors a helpful
glimpse of the distinctive inner workings of their "adversaries' "
businesses. 92 The continued secrecy of such information is justified
by the inequity of allowing a competitor to gain an undeserved
advantage through free access to special business processes de-
veloped by the communicant.
Certain business data frequently deemed by the courts to fall
within exemption (4)-although placed there by a potentially abu-
sive construction of the exemption 9 3-have included details of
competitors' unpublicized business information and processes,
made distinctive-and therefore confidential-by the long period
during which they were developed. Customer lists, business sales
statistics, inventory details, and manufacturing processes thus have
been declared exempt from disclosure not only in the Senate and
House Reports on the Freedom of Information Act 94 but also in
several judicial decisions. 9 5 Pricing statistics,96 product designs,97
intricacies of testing,98 and costs of production, overhead and
general operation,99 although not specifically mentioned in either
the Senate or House Reports, have also been considered
confidential in decisions which have recognized the need to guard
certain areas of inner corporate life from public scrutiny. Such
data should be considered confidential under the new construction
of exemption (4), for "substantial harm" could befall a businessman
if his competitors were to learn of the specific techniques which he
uses in his business.100
92 A "trade secret" is an unpatented, but nevertheless secret, process or device whose
confidentiality is crucial to a businessman for the advantage it gives him over his com-
petitors. See note 20 supra. In exemption (4) the pairing of confidential "commercial or
financial information" with "trade secrets" strongly suggests the congressional purpose to
save from disclosure commercial information whose strategic importance is similar to that of
trade secrets.
" See notes 32-54 and accompanying text supra.
H See H.R. REP. 10; S. REP. 9.
" See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (exempting
customer lists and sales statistics); Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 355 F. Supp. 1171 (D.D.C.
1973) (manufacturing processes); National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 351 F.
Supp. 404 (D.D.C. 1972) (inventory, sales, and profit details).
96 See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
'7 See Bristol-Myers Co. v. FrC, 424 F.2d 935 (D:'C. Cir.), cert. denied. 400 U.S. 824
(1970).
98 See Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 355 F. Supp. 1171 (D.D.C. 1973).
a See id.
100 A competitor's access to information describing a communicant's business methods
may prove detrimental to the communicant in a number of ways. For example, gaining such
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Some business information, however, carries significantly less
potential for harm than the data mentioned above. A company's
assets and liabilities, its net profits and receipts, and the salaries
and bonuses it pays to its personnel are examples of information
whose revelation should not, under ordinary circumstances, sub-
stantially prejudice a businessman's competitive interests. Any
harm resulting from disclosure of such information is likely, under
the new objective definition of confidentiality, to be considered
"permissible" at worst. Moreover, this information is similar to that
routinely released from corporate files for inclusion in year-end
balance sheets or for use in labor-management negotiations. 101
Such information can be publicized when, as in most cases, it does
not reveal the special manufacturing processes, business tech-
niques, or sales and cost statistics which are unique to a business
and which, as a consequence, are especially useful to competitors.
Not all of the business information mentioned above lends
itself to neat categorization under the labels "substantial" or "per-
missible" harm. Records of a company's net receipts, for example,
disclosure of which would not normally be considered prejudicial,
may, in certain situations, reveal details of sales operations which
could prove to be substantially prejudicial in the hands of particu-
lar competitors. Under an objective construction of exemption (4),
however, the courts will not be straitjacketed by any strict categori-
zation of what information should be "exempt" and what informa-
tion should be "disclosable"; instead, they will be able to fashion a
federal information policy tailored to the actual harm which a
communicant would be likely to suffer in a given fact situation.
Under an objective construction of exemption (4) communi-
cants need not fear the uncertainties of judicial balancing of the
public interest in disclosure against their assertions of con-
fidentiality.' Regardless of any alleged public interest in disclos-
knowledge may enable a competitor to copy special manufacturing processes or techniques
which had previously given the communicant an advantage. Or, a competitor might use
descriptive statistics of the communicant's business (e.g., sales, costs, pricing, inventory,
customer, and profit data) to attack the communicant's weak spots. Knowledge of another's
cost statistics, for example, might enable a competitor to gain advantage by anticipating
changes and adjusting his own output or prices accordingly.
1I See, e.g., NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956) (company not bargaining in
good faith when it refused to disclose to union certain financial data).
102 Indeed, the Freedom of Information Act was designed to preclude case-by-case
balancing of interests in disclosure against interests in confidentiality. Under the old
Administrative Procedure Act it had been discovered that such balancing provided a wide
statutory loophole for the continued secrecy of government information. See notes 10-12
and accompanying text supra. A government agency could assert, in opposition to a demand
for the disclosure of information in its hands, that the "public interest," "good cause found,"
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ure, business information in the hands of government agencies will
remain confidential if its revelation would cause substantial harm
to a communicant's business interests.'0 3 Only if no such appreci-
able harm appears probable will a communicant's commercial or
financial information be released to the public.
Exemption (4) was designed to protect communicants' interests
in privacy-more particularly, their interest in maintaining the
competitive position of their businesses.' 0 4 By so protecting com-
municants, it was hoped that the exemption would encourage
businessmen to more freely communicate financial information to
the government to assist federal agencies in making policy
decisions.' 0 5 Such goals will be furthered by the opportunity given
to communicants under the new construction of the exemption to
make known to a court any disadvantages they might suffer
through the disclosure of certain commercial or financial informa-
tion. Thus, a more objective definition of confidentiality can ade-
quately protect the interests of communicants in privacy while
furthering the disclosure policies in the Freedom of Information
Act.
As the courts become more practiced in applying the new
objective construction of exemption (4), communicants should be-
come more confident in the equity of the new test and more aware
of what types of information will be considered confidential and
what types will be considered disclosable. They should be more
willing, therefore, to release private commercial or financial infor-
or the absence of any party "properly and directly concerned" required that the information
in question not be disclosed. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238. Such rationales
often allowed agencies to withhold arguably public information from disclosure when their
interest in confidentiality appeared relatively slight. See H.R. REP. 4-6.
The Freedom of Information Act was designed to replace the balancing test of the old
Administrative Procedure Act with a general disclosure requirement subject to nine
specifically limited exemptions. See note 13 and accompanying text supra. By providing that
any agency information not falling squarely within those nine exemptions be made available
to "any person," the new Act made dear its purpose to insure that federal bureaus would no
longer rationalize withholding information from the public by assertions that their own
policies favoring confidentiality outweighed the public interest in disclosure. See Bristol-
Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
Nevertheless, a few commentators have maintained that the meaning of ambiguous
terms in he Act's nine exemptions (e.g., exemption (4)'s "confidentiality") should be
determined by balancing the public's interest in disclosure against communicants' varyifig
interests in privacy. See, e.g., Davis 783-84; Note, Freedom of Information Act-Early Judicial
Interpretations, 44 WASH. L. REv. 641, 665 n. 107 (1969); 80 HARv. L. REv. 909, 911 n.11
(1967).
103 In the alternative,, if such information can be released without "identifying details"
in a manner that would prevent disclosure of the communicant's identity, it will be released.
See note 71 supra.




mation to the government. In this way, the communicants' interests
in privacy will be reconciled with the Freedom of Information Act's
dual policies of increased government access to private information
and increased public access to government information.
CONCLUSION
In exempting from disclosure "trade secrets and commercial
or financial information ... [that is] privileged or confidential"' 0 6
subsection (b) (4) of the Freedom of Information Act raises special
problems of interpretation. It is relatively easy for courts to deter-
mine whether certain information ought to be exempted from
disclosure under that subsection as "trade secrets" or "privileged"
information. It is more difficult to define the sweep of the term
"confidential information" within the meaning of the exemption.
Exemption (4)'s confidentiality requirement was designed to en-
courage the courts to objectively consider all relevant circumstances
before concluding that certain commercial or financial information
should or should not be exempted from disclosure. Unfortunately,
in adopting a subjective test of confidentiality, the courts have
surrendered to the agencies the judicial responsibility to objectively
determine the appropriateness of disclosure in disputes arising
under the Freedom of Information Act. In providing a loophole
through which argnably public information could be exempted
from disclosure by a mere assertion of a communicant's intent, the
courts have contravened the Act's purpose of guaranteeing the
fullest possible revelation of information in the hands of federal
agencies.
Only a test of confidentiality which takes into account the real
economic harm which disclosure may bring to a communicant can
adequately guarantee objectivity, consistency, and a fair considera-
tion of all relevant circumstances in judicial decisions under the
Freedom of Information Act. Under such a test the general dis-
closure policies of the Act will receive the consideration they
deserve, while the individual rights of privacy protected by the
Act's exemptions will suffer no greater infringement than is
justified by such overriding policies. Judicial decisions based upon
this solid, objective test will give substance to the mandate of the
Freedom of Information Act that only genuinely confidential
commercial or financial information should be shielded from pub-
lic scrutiny. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr.
106 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (4) (1970).
